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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Jamarow Trowery appeals the District Court’s revocation of his supervised 







In 2006, Trowery pleaded guilty to Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon, 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and was sentenced to 40 months imprisonment followed by 3 years 
supervised release.  Among the conditions of his supervised release were prohibitions on 
“possess[ing] a firearm or destructive device” or “violat[ing] another federal, state or 
local crime.”  In April 2007, Trowery completed his prison term and began his term of 
supervised release.  Less than six months later, Trowery was arrested for two state 
crimes: Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105, and 
Cruelty to Animals, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511.  A jury convicted Trowery of both 
offenses, and he was sentenced to 5 to 10 years imprisonment. 
Two months after his state court sentencing, the United States Probation Office 
filed a petition to revoke Trowery’s supervised release for violating the aforementioned 
conditions of release.  Following a revocation hearing, the District Court concluded that 
Trowery violated the terms of his supervised release.  As a result, the Court revoked 
Trowery’s supervised release and sentenced him to 12 months imprisonment to be served 
consecutively with the state court sentence.  The District Court also noted that if 
Trowery’s state court convictions were overturned on appeal, there would be ample time 
to revisit his federal revocation sentence before his federal prison sentence began.  
Trowery timely appealed. 
II. 
 
We review the District Court’s decision to revoke Trowery’s supervised release 




Underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error and legal issues are reviewed  de 
novo.  United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 565-66 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 882 (3d Cir. 1991)).  The District Court had 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Trowery challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the District Court’s 
decision to revoke his supervised release.  The District Court found that a jury conviction, 
without more, is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Trowery committed two state 
crimes, thereby violating the terms of his release.  Trowery contends that the convictions 
alone are insufficient because he never admitted the underlying conduct and he has 
appealed the convictions.  This argument is based on a misreading of United States v. 
Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562 (3d Cir. 2004). 
A supervised release violation must be proven by a mere preponderance of the 
evidence.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 854-55 (3d Cir. 
2006).  “What matters is whether [the defendant] committed [a] crime as a matter of 
fact.”  Poellnitz, 372 F.3d at 567.  In order “to revoke probation it is not necessary that 
the probationer be adjudged guilty of a crime, but only that the court be reasonably 
satisfied that he has violated one of the conditions” of supervised release.  Id. at 566.  
Although a jury conviction is not necessary to show a violation, it is plainly sufficient.  
Indeed, a jury conviction is the strongest evidentiary basis for finding a violation because 
a jury conviction is itself a finding of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., 




objective fact that initially was cloaked in all the constitutional safeguards, and is now a 
matter of public record.”). 
Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that Trowery is appealing his state 
convictions.  Under Pennsylvania law, a criminal conviction continues to have preclusive 
effect while on appeal “unless or until that conviction is reversed.”  Shaffer v. Smith, 673 
A.2d 872, 875 (Pa. 1996).  As our sister circuits have held: 
A criminal conviction after a trial at which the probationer was entitled to 
all the protections afforded a criminal defendant including formal rules of 
evidence, the right to assigned counsel if indigent, and the requirement that 
the state establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt certainly affords a more 
than sufficient basis for revocation of probation, even if that conviction is 
still awaiting appellate review. 
 
Roberson v. Connecticut, 501 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1974); see also United States v. 
Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Fleming, 9 F.3d 1253 (7th Cir. 
1993).  Like these courts, we hold that a criminal conviction is sufficient evidence to 
revoke supervised release even if the case is on appeal, and even if counsel claims that 
appeal is meritorious.  As the District Court explained, if Trowery’s state appeal is 
successful, there will be ample time to revisit the revocation. 
Still, Trowery argues that Poellnitz dictates a contrary result.  Poellnitz was also 
sentenced to supervised release that prohibited committing any “federal, state, or local” 
crimes.  Poellnitz, 372 F.3d at 564.  While on supervised release, Poellnitz was arrested 
and charged with a number of state crimes to which he pleaded nolo contendere.  Id.  
Based solely on the fact of those convictions, the District Court revoked Poellnitz’s 
supervised release.  On appeal, we held that a nolo contendere plea, without more, was 




reasoned that under Pennsylvania law, “[i]n pleading nolo contendere; the defendant does 
not admit his guilt, but merely consents to being punished as if he were guilty.”  Id. at 
568.  As a result, we concluded “a nolo plea . . . has no evidentiary value in assessing 
whether the defendant committed a crime.”  Id. at 567. 
Although we found the absence of a guilty plea controlling in Poellnitz, that was 
only because of “the peculiar legal effect of the plea of nolo contendere[,]” which arises 
without a verdict and “is indisputably tantamount to a conviction, [but] . . . is not 
necessarily tantamount to an admission of factual guilt.”  372 F.3d at 566 (first emphasis 
added).  In that context, we found that the controlling question was “whether the plea that 
Poellnitz entered can be deemed to establish underlying guilt, and not merely the fact of a 
criminal conviction.”  Id. at 567.  We were careful, however, to contrast a nolo 
contendere plea with a verdict that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt:  “[i]n the 
normal course, one might expect that if the court finds [that a] defendant was convicted 
of a crime, the court may automatically revoke release based on the defendant’s 
commission of the underlying offense.”  Id. at 566.  The instant appeal is that normal 
course. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s revocation of 
Trowery’s supervised release. 
